![]() ![]() The ease by which a vulnerability can spread was highlighted in May, when an image shared on social media bricked certain Android devices if set as homescreen wallpaper. SMS messaging apps do not even compress or strip metadata by default. ![]() But they do not screen for threats crafted into the image structure itself. Social media apps remove metadata, such as the location where the photo was taken, and compress the size of the image. What the apps won’t do, though, is clean images sent over their apps to remove threats should you save those images to your own device. Once you move an image from outside this sandbox, so to speak, onto your own device, then the risk changes. Simply put, those problems are with the apps and not the images, you trust the app to safely handle whatever content it displays. That said, earlier this year, Google’s Project Zero team warned that the image handling by messengers themselves on iOS could be defeated when an unusual file type was handled.īut issues with mainstream apps can be fixed-and if you stick to hyper-scale messaging and social media apps, then they will address any such image handling vulnerabilities once disclosed. We saw this last year, with WhatsApp and Telegram exposed to an Android vulnerability where images were saved to an external disk. ![]() The issue comes when you save that to the album on your internal phone’s storage or an external disk. If you were to receive a malicious image in one of your messaging or social media apps, then viewing it within the applications is almost certainly fine.
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